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RECENT DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DEPAR TMENT OF TRANSPORTATION V. JAMES RIVER
INSURANCE COMPANY'
I. INTRODUCTION
In January, the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a mandatory
arbitration clause in a James River Insurance Company policy. 2 The decision
was groundbreaking in that it resolved a conflict between the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA")3 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act4 and determined
that McCarran-Ferguson specifically exempted a Washington statute from
FAA preemption.5 The Washington statutes at issue were Revised Code of
Washington ("RCW") §§ 48.18.200(1)(b), which prohibits insurance
contracts from "depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action
against the insurer,"6 and 48.15.150(1), which requires that "an unauthorized
insurer must be sued in the superior court of the county in which the cause of
action arose."7 James River Insurance Company ("James River") sought to
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act but the trial court
held-and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed-that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act shielded the Washington statutes from FAA preemption and
guaranteed a policyholder's right to bring an action in state court to enforce
an insurance contract.8
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts and procedure of this case overlap slightly in that the facts
leading up to the suit and the disagreements between the parties concern
procedural aspects of the insurance policies. The facts below are, thus, those
leading to the procedural disputes, which later rolled into the lawsuit.
1 State of Washington, Department of Transportation V. James River Insurance
Company, 176 Wash.2d 390 (2013) (hereinafter "James River Ins.").
2 Id. at 392.
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
5 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 402.
6 WASH. REv. CODE § 48.18.200(1)(b).
7 WASH. REv. CODE § 48.15.150(1).
8 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 402-03.
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A. Facts
James River issued two insurance policies to Scarcella Brothers, Inc.
("Scarcella"), which provided liability coverage for work done by Scarcella
on a highway project for the Washington State Department of Transportation
("WSDOT") from 2008 to 2011.9 Scarcella requested that James River
include WSDOT as a co-insured under the surplus line policies, which was
done and led to WSDOT's claim of coverage.' 0
The claims against WSDOT underlying this case arose from an accident
at the scene of the Scarcella project that occurred in 2009.11 Representatives
of those injured or killed later added Scarcella as a defendant and Scarcella
forwarded WSDOT's request for a defense under the insurance policies to
James River.12 James River accepted WSDOT's tender for representation
under a reservation of all rights under the insurance policies and reminded
WSDOT of the mandatory arbitration clause' 3 contained within the contract,
demanding acquiescence to the arbitration of coverage disputes.14 However,
WSDOT did not acquiesce and, when James River sought to enforce the
arbitration provisions of the insurance policies, this lawsuit was initiated.
B. Procedural History
In September of 2010, James River sought to initiate arbitration of a
coverage dispute, to which WSDOT objected and then filed a declaratory
judgment action against James River, seeking a declaration that the
arbitration clauses contained in the policies were void.'5 In response, James
River filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination
by the trial court that the arbitration clauses were binding and enforceable.16
9 Id. at 392.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 393.
12 Id.
13 Id. (the arbitration clause, labeled "BINDING ARBITRATION," read in
pertinent part as follows: "Should we and the insured disagree as to the rights and
obligations owed by us under this policy, including the effect of any applicable statutes or
common law upon the contractual obligations otherwise owed, either party may make a
written demand that the dispute be subjected to binding arbitration.").
14 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 393.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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James River then filed a motion for summary judgment to compel arbitration
on January 28, 2011, while, on the same day, WSDOT filed a motion to bar
the initiation of arbitration proceedings.' 7 The trial court heard oral
arguments on May 20, 2011 and issued an order denying James River's
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clauses were barred
by RCW 48.18.200 and RCW 48.15.150.18 Under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, the Washington statutes were shielded from FAA preemption due to
McCarran-Ferguson's reverse-preemption effect.1 9 James River Appealed the
trial court's order and the Supreme Court of Washington granted direct
review. 20
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
In order to determine whether the arbitration clauses in the James River
insurance policies were binding and enforceable, the Court had to answer the
following questions: (1) Do RCW 48.18.200 and RCW 48.15.150 prohibit
binding arbitration clauses in surplus line insurance contracts?; and (2) If so,
does the McCarran-Ferguson Act shield RCW 48.18.200 and RCW
48.15.150 from preemption by the FAA? 21 The Court found that the binding
arbitration clauses were prohibited by the Washington statutes and held that
the FAA was reverse-preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, meaning
James River could not compel arbitration where WSDOT sought to pursue its
insurance claims in court.22
A. Arbitration Clauses are Prohibited in Washington Insurance
Contracts
The Court, gathered en banc, reviewed the issue of statutory
interpretation regarding RCW 48.18.200 de novo 23 and held that the
Washington statute does, in fact, prohibit the inclusion of arbitration clauses
17 Id.
1 8 Id. at 393-94.
1 9 Id at 394.
20 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 394.
21 Id
2 2 Id at 402-03.
23 Id at 394 (citing Kruger Clinic Orthopaedics, LLC v. Regence BlueShield, 138
P.3d 936, 939 (2006)).
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in insurance contracts.24 James River sought to convince the Court that RCW
48.18.200 does not invalidate arbitration agreements where the law prohibits
any language in insurance contracts "depriving the courts of this state of the
jurisdiction of action against the insurer" and, thus, does not implicate the
FAA or McCarran-Ferguson. 25 WSDOT argued that the arbitration clause
violates the Washington statute because it "deprives the court of full
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the parties' claims." WSDOT further
argued that the FAA's and federal government's policies in favor of
arbitration did not preempt the Washington statutes because the McCarran-
Ferguson Act shielded state laws that regulate "the business of insurance"
from federal preemption under the FAA. 26
In order to ascertain the intent of the legislature in drafting RCW
48.18.200(1)(b), the Court first looked at the plain meaning of the statute.27
Both parties agreed with the Court that the terms "jurisdiction" and "action"
are susceptible to multiple ' meanings and interpretations. 28 One
interpretation, as advocated by James River, is that the statute was meant to
prohibit forum selection and the designation of jurisdictions outside the State
of Washington as the sole venue for actions against the insurer "because such
agreements deprive Washington policyholders of the right to bring an action
against the insurer in the courts of this state." 29 A second and competing
interpretation of the statute, advocated by WSDOT, is that the statute was
meant to prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses "because such agreements
deprive Washington policyholders of the right to bring an original action
against the insurer in the courts of this state." 30 Due to the mutual agreement
on the statute's vagueness, the Court moved on to determine if case law
surrounding RCW 48.18.200's enactment would shine light on its meaning
but, unfortunately, it was "not particularly helpful." 31
James River claimed WSDOT's position that arbitration deprives the
court of jurisdiction harkens back to common law arbitration, as opposed to
the statutory arbitration that the State of Washington's legislature enacted in
24 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 400.
25 Id. at 394-95; WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.200(1)(b).
26 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 395; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
27 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 396.
2 8 Id
2 9 Id
3 0 Id
31 Id. at 396-97.
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1911 through RCW 48.18.200.32 James River referenced the Supreme Court
of Washington's decision in Dickie Manufacturing Co. v. Sound
Construction & Engineering Co., where the Court found RCW 48.18.200
contained "positive provisions giving the court jurisdiction to adopt, modify,
and enforce the award." 33 Reliance upon the current and former views of
arbitration were "not particularly helpful" to the Court, which recognized that
the full phrase 'jurisdiction of action against the insurer" was operative-and
the phrase "jurisdiction of action" does not mean the same thing as the term
"jurisdiction"-in ascertaining the legislature's intent in RCW 48.18.200.34
The full phrasing of RCW 48.18.200, WSDOT argued, suggests that the
legislature sought to give parties the right to bring an original action in the
state courts of Washington, not just to maintain the courts' jurisdiction over
the enforcement of awards. 35
In a special proceeding to confirm an arbitration award, the jurisdiction
of the court is, in fact, limited as compared to its jurisdiction in an original
action. 36 Specifically, arbitration provisions in contracts between insurers
and health care providers deprive the health care providers of the "judicial
remedies" guaranteed by regulation, which grants parties the right to initiate
"an action to litigate the dispute" and does not simply secure the right to
judicial review. 37 To accept James River's argument that the limited
"jurisdiction" to review arbitration awards satisfies RCW 48.18.200 would
"frustrate the legislature's intent because ... binding arbitration agreements
deprive our state's courts of the jurisdiction they would normally possess in
an original action by depriving them of the jurisdiction to review the
32 Id at 397.
33 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 397 (citing Dickie Manufacturing Co. v. Sound
Construction & Engineering Co., 159 P. 129, 131 (1916) (hereinafter "Dickie
Manufacturing")) (emphasis added in James River Ins. decision).
34 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 397-98. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.18.200(1)(b) (emphasis added).
35 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 397-98.
36 Id. (citing Price v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 946 P.2d 388, 391 (1997) in which
the Supreme Court of Washington stated, "[a]lthough a party may apply to the court to
confirm an arbitration award, that is not the same as bringing an original action to obtain
a monetary judgment. A confirmation action is no more than a motion for an order to
render judgment on the award previously made by the arbitrators pursuant to contract. If
the court does not modify, vacate, or correct the award, the court exercises a mere
ministerial duty to reduce the award to judgment.").
37 Id. at 398-99 (citing Kruger Clinic Orthopaedics, LLC v. Regence BlueShield,
138 P.3d 936, 942-43 (2006) (referring to WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-43-322(4)
(2005))).
845
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
substance of the dispute between the parties." 38 Guaranteeing the courts'
ability to analyze and review the substance of disputes ensures the protection
of the laws of Washington as provided in RCW 48.18.200(1)(a). 39
Thus, unless the legislature specifically provides otherwise, the Court
held that RCW 48.18.200 prohibits binding arbitration agreements in
insurance contracts; because the agreements in this case were pre-dispute
binding arbitration agreements, the agreements are unenforceable. 40 The
Court did not need to address the provisions of RCW 48.15.150 because it
determined that RCW 48.18.200, in itself, prohibited binding arbitration
agreements.41
B. McCarran-Ferguson Reverse-Preempted the FAA
After determining that RCW 48.18.200 prohibited binding arbitration
agreements, the Court turned its attention to whether the McCarran-Ferguson
Act shielded the state law from FAA preemption. Generally, where a state
enacts a law of "general applicability" that prohibits arbitration agreements,
the FAA's pro-arbitration provisions preempt the state law.42 One exception
to the general rule, however, is where a state law is enacted "for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance" pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.43
A statute "aimed at protecting or regulating the performance of an
insurance contract . .. is a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, within the meaning of the first clause of § 2(b) [of the
3 8 Id. at 399.
39 Id. at 399. See RCW 48.18.200(1)(a) (prohibiting insurance contract provisions
that "requiring it to be construed according to the laws of any other state or country
except as necessary to meet the requirements of the motor vehicle financial responsibility
laws of such other state or country.").
40 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 400.
41 id
42 Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)).
43 Id. at 400-01. See the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (providing in
part: "No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . .. unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That [the federal
antitrust statutes] shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law."
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FAA]."44 Here, WSDOT argued that the provisions of RCW 48.18.200
regulate the business of insurance because they directly relate to the content
of the insurance contract itself.45 James River responded with the argument
that the statutory provisions do not regulate the insurance industry because
they are merely choice of forum provisions but, as the Court ruled in the first
section of its analysis, the provisions were not merely regarding choice of
forum.46
The Court, therefore, denied James River's motion to compel arbitration
as it held that the provisions of RCW 48.18.200 regulate the industry of
insurance and are, thus, "shielded from preemption by the FAA under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act."47
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPACT OF THE COURT'S RULING
The Court's ruling is one of several recent rulings that resolve a conflict
between the FAA and another federal statute.48 Since its ruling in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,49 the Supreme Court has yet to rule on a case
involving a conflict between the FAA and a federal law. If the Supreme
Court decides to take this case or one like it-either from a Federal Court of
Appeals or a state's highest court-it will have the opportunity to clarify and
resolve the question of just how expansive are the reach and policy
implications of the FAA. A ruling resolving an FAA conflict with a federal
44 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 401 (quoting Kruger Clinic Orthopaedics, LLC
v. Regence BlueShield, 138 P.3d 936, 940 (quoting United States Department of
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 501 (1993))) (internal quotations removed).
45 Id at 402. The Court compared the statutory provisions at issue in this case to the
statutes and regulations involved in Kruger, which concerned the contracts between
insurers and health care providers and were found to be shielded from FAA preemption
via McCarran-Ferguson. See Kruger, 138 P.3d at 940.
46 James River Ins., supra note 1, at 402.
47 Id at 402-03.
48 Id. at note 4 (In particular, the Court referenced the First Circuit's decision in
DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir.2000) (referring to the
historical perspective regarding arbitration as supporting the notion that mandatory
arbitration is not contrary to a court's jurisdiction) and a Louisiana Appeals Court's
decision in Macaluso v. Watson, 171 So.2d 755, 757 (La. Ct. App.1965) (holding the
statutory language "depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against
the insurer" prohibits binding arbitration agreements). Both cases concerned statutory
language similar to the provisions in this case but those courts took different approaches
and each resolved the issue differently.).
49 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011)
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statute would potentially have significant implications for many heavily-
regulated industries, such as insurance, energy, or the financial securities
industry.50
With the current disagreement among courts as to just how the FAA
must interact with the McCarran-Ferguson Act specifically, and with other
federal laws generally, the Supreme Court docket is ripe for another
significant arbitration-related decision. Although multiple courts have
acknowledged the interaction between the reverse-preempting McCarran-
Ferguson Act and the FAA, the underlying question of whether the relevant
state law regulates the insurance industry seems to be the key question. If the
U.S. Supreme Court chooses to review such a case, it would be interesting to
also note any guidance as to what specific inquiries or determinations must
be made in order to establish whether the reverse-preempting federal law
applies to the specific state law at issue in any future cases.
Patrick Noonan
848
50 See generally, e.g., Department of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.,
FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201 (Feb. 21, 2013) (demonstrating the
morass of securities regulations and their interaction with the FAA).
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